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Abstract
In this paper we examine the Lorenz ordering when the number of pay
states is finite, as is most often the case in public sector employment. We
characterize the majorization set: the set of pay scales such that some
distribution  is more egalitarian than another distribution , with  and
 being two distributions of a given sum total. We show that while this set
is infinite, it is generated as the convex hull of a finite number of points.
We then discuss several applications of the result, including the problem of
reducing inequality between groups, conditions under which diﬀerent pay
scales may reverse the ordering of two Lorenz curves, and the use of the
majorization set in relation to optimal income taxation.
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1. Introduction
In recent years there has been a growing interest in measuring inequality in rela-
tion to qualitative data such as self assessed health, happiness and life satisfaction
more broadly. The research community has provided new methods of analyzing
qualitative data 1 alongside a well established literature on the analysis of contin-
uous income data, founded on generalizations of the Lorenz ordering and related
income inequality measures (Atkinson, 1970; Ok, 1996; Foster and Shneyerov,
1999; Gadjos and Weymark, 2005; Savaglio, 2006; and del Río and Alonso-Villar,
2010). Yet the problem of measuring inequality in presence of a finite number of
discrete pay states is yet to be examined in fuller detail. The analysis of this prob-
lem, involving discrete data—the way qualitative data are discrete—yet cardinal—the
way income data are cardinal—is the purpose of the current paper.
An economic theory of competitive earnings diﬀerentials predicts that earn-
ings rise with the disutility of work associated with various occupations, or various
roles within the same enterprise. A tournament theory of internal labour markets
also produces a discrete set of pay states, where "...the hierarchical structure of
the firm rests on a given grid of remunerations in which wages change discontinu-
ously, and only with promotion ." (Cahuc et al. 2014, p. 365.) Accordingly, that
income or earnings present themselves in a discrete and finite number of states
is certainly often the norm in public sector employment. For instance, Britain’s
Senior Civil Service has four pay states, namely Assistant Secretary, Deputy Secre-
tary, Permanent Secretary and Head of Civil Service (Department of Finance and
Personnel, 2014). Additionally, there are annual pay increments between the first
and second, second and third and third and fourth of these pay classes. A similar
pay structure may be found in the government sector of other EU countries.
The particular perspective we shall follow on the measurement of inequality
with a finite number of pay states will be that of characterizing the majorization
set : that is, the entire set of pay scales that allow for a Lorenz curve ranking of two
distributions (say public sector workers in the London area versus those of other
parts of Britain.) In the mathematical sciences, Brualdi (1984) characterizes the
set of doubly stochastic matrices given two fixed vectors  and , that enable one
to express  as the product of a doubly stochastic matrix and the vector , and
calls the resulting set the majorization polytope. Following this lead, the present
1See for instance Allison and Foster (2004), Apouey (2007), Abul Naga and Yalcin (2008),
Zheng (2011), Gravel and Moyes, (2012), Chakravarty and Zoli (2012), Cowell and Flachaire
(2012), Kobus and Miło´s (2012), Andreoli and Zoli (2013), and Gravel et al. (2014).
2
paper explores the concept of the majorization set in economics. Consider the
general problem of selecting parameter values for a policy vector (this could be
a pay scale, a combination of an income allowance and a uniform tax rate, etc.)
in a way as to reduce inequality over an initial situation. The majorization set is
the set of policy vectors that achieve an ordering of Lorenz curves of a benchmark
distribution and the distribution of interest.
The characterization of the majorization set and its related properties can be
informative for examining several existing problems in the income distribution
literature. The first result of the paper is that the majorization set is a closed and
bounded type of convex set known as a polytope 2. Such a set is the convex hull of
a finite number of points (pay scales), known as the vertices of the majorization
set. Central to this result, is a majorization matrix that we introduce in the
paper, that expresses the partial sums (inequalities) defining Lorenz dominance.
The vertices of the majorization set may be thought of as policy benchmarks,
providing the limits of feasible pay policies. The vertices are then jointly suﬃcient
statistics for generating the majorization set. The second result of the paper is
that the majorization set and its dual set (the set of pay scales that allow for the
reverse ordering of the same two distributions) are separable convex sets. The
coordinates of the separating hyperplanes are provided by the non-zero rows of
the majorization matrix.
Equipped with these results, we discuss five applications of the majorization
set. Firstly we revisit the problem of characterizing the set of income transforma-
tions that preserve the Lorenz ordering of two distributions, a question studied by
Moyes (1994) in the context of continuous income data. We exploit the convexity
of the majorization set to revisit this problem in the context of a finite number of
pay scales, where we establish a simple relation between the set of transformations
of the pay scale that preserve the Lorenz ordering of a pair of distributions and
the vertices of the majorization set. Following Bourguignon (1979) and Shorrocks
(1980), it is now a well established practice in empirical work to express inequality
in a population as a function of inequality within groups and inequality between
groups. One important question to address therefore in presence of a finite num-
ber of pay states is how diﬀerent pay scales impact on within groups and between
groups inequality separately. We show how the answer to this question relates to
the rank of the majorization matrix.
Thirdly, the results of this paper enable us to shed light on an important prob-
2A polytope may be thought of as a generalization of the concept of a polygon in higher
dimensional spaces. An exact definition of a polytope will be given below.
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lem discussed in relation to the measurement of inequality with qualitative data.
It was first recognized by Allison and Foster (2004) and Zheng (2011) that when
the numerical scale defining the economic status of individuals is undetermined,
two diﬀerent numerical scales may reverse the ordering of a pair of Lorenz curves.
Using the framework of the majorization set, we are able to characterize necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for Lorenz curve reversals not to occur. These conditions
are expressed as inequalities involving products of the majorization matrix and
vectors defining the vertices of a set that contains the majorization set.
It is evident that in practice incentive, participation, and other institutional
constraints provide theoretical limits to income redistribution (Roberts, 1984; Hin-
driks and Myles, 2013 ch. 18). Incentive contracts typically place restrictions
on the size of increments between successive pay states. Our fourth application
therefore examines how the majorization set may shrink in the light of incentive
considerations in the context of tournament theories of pay and promotion. Our
fifth and final application is to discuss the structure of the majorization set in
the context of the design of a linear income tax scheme. This final application
is motivated by the need to illustrate that applications of the majorization set
are not confined to the design of equitable pay schemes, and that this framework
is equally relevant in all aspects of income redistribution policies such as in the
design of social insurance or diﬀerential commodity taxation.
To set the scene for the problem that will occupy us in much of Section 3,
consider the following hypothetical example. Suppose you are manager of two big-
band orchestras, comprising 30 musicians each. The two orchestras diﬀer in that
their brass, keyboard, and rhythm sections have diﬀerent numbers of individuals.
You cannot change the composition of these two orchestras; but you are free to
choose pay scales (that will apply to both orchestras) subject to two types of
restrictions. Firstly, pay is ordered in a given fashion: a brass musician must not
earn less than a keyboard player, who must not earn less than a rhythm section
musician. Secondly, you must choose the pay structure in a way that the lowest
pay cannot be negative, and the highest pay must be finite. You recognize that the
pay structure you will adopt will impact directly on the welfare of your orchestras,
and you are interested in studying how a particular pay scale will impact on the
ordering of the two pay distributions in terms of inequality. This paper aims at
characterizing the set of pay structures such that the distribution of earnings in
one orchestra is more egalitarian than in the other orchestra.
The next section of the paper contains definitions of some key concepts. Sec-
tion 3 presents the two central results pertaining to the majorization set. Section
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4 discusses areas of application of the majorization set, while Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. Notation and definitions
In this paper we study the problem of measuring inequality in the context of an
economy where the economic status of a person  = 1   + 1 is defined over
 = 1   possible states. We associate with these  states a column vector
 = (1  )0 and we refer to  as a pay scale. There are two assumptions
carried over throughout the results we shall obtain in this paper:
Assumption 1 There are  economic states ordered from 1 (the lowest) to 
(the highest.)
Assumption 2 Any given pay scale  = (1  )0 is bounded from below by
0 that is 1 ≥ 0 and is bounded from above by a finite number max such that
 ≤ max
That is, any pay scale  is an element of the set of increasing scales:
C = { ∈ R : 0 ≤ 1 ≤ 2 ≤  ≤  ≤ max}  (2.1)
Throughout, the letters       are all used to refer to natural numbers.
We let N Z and R respectively denote the sets of natural numbers, integers and
real numbers. With the exception of N Z and R, we will let S denote a set, 
denote a matrix, and  denote a vector. Unless otherwise specified, all vectors
are implicitly defined as being column vectors. If  and  are two column vectors,
then 0 being the transpose of , 0 is the inner product of  and  If  denotes
a matrix, the null space of  is written as N()We define  = (1  1)0 as
an −dimensional vector of ones, so that for any vector  ∈ R 0 = 0 is
equal to the sum of the elements of  We also define 0 as an −dimensional
vector of zeroes, and 0 as a  ×  matrix of zeroes. The notation  ≤ 0
signifies that every element of  is non-positive.
A distribution is some vector  = (1()  +1())0. As our judgement on
the level of inequality is anonymous, we adopt the convention that the vector  is
ordered from richest to poorest, and we write  ∈ D where
D = {(1  +1)0 ∈ (1  )+1 :
1 ≥ 2 ≥  ≥ +1} (2.2)
is the set of distributions that is the subject of our study in this paper. It is also
convenient to summarize our data with counts. We define the function count() :
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D → Z1× where the  element of count() equals   being the number
of realizations of state  in the distribution  Stated more simply, count() is
an -dimensional row vector and count()( + 1) is the frequency distribution
associated with 
Each individual  is thus associated with a particular economic state  Thus,
while count() is fixed for each given distribution  ∈ D it is clear that  is a
function of  so that for two distinct scales 1 2 ∈ C it is generally the case
that (1) 6= (2) For this reason, if  denotes another distribution,  =  will
signify that () = () for all  ∈ C or equivalently, count() = count()
Our central interest throughout is in the Lorenz ordering, the Hardy-Littlewood-
Polya relation defined over ( + 1)−dimensional vectors   ∈ D. Indeed, this is
the building block of the income inequality literature, as well as being at the heart
of the majorization literature in the mathematical sciences 3. For a given  ∈ C,
 has less inequality than  written () ≺ () if and only if the following + 1
conditions are satisfied:
X
=1
() ≤
X
=1
()  = 1   (2.3)
+1X
=1
() =
+1X
=1
() (2.4)
We call the above set of equations the +1 partial sums. Note that given the above
definition, either () ≺ () () ≺ () or () and () are not comparable,
in which case we write () k ()
Because the above partial sums define a system of +1 linear inequalities in the
vector  it is possible to express them in compact matrix notation. Specifically,
letting  denote an × matrix and letting  denote an -dimensional row vector,
the inequalities (2.3—2.4) may be written as follows:
 ≤ 0 (2.5)
 = 0 (2.6)
3Beyond the measurement of inequality in the social sciences, the majorization ordering finds
many applications in the mathematical sciences. These include combinatorial analysis, linear
algebra and eigen-value analysis, probability and statistics as well as geometric inequalities. See
Ando (1994) for a survey, as well as Marshall et al. (2010).
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To clarify this notation, it is useful to consider a simple example.
Example 1 Assume there are four individuals ( + 1 = 4) and  = 6 pay
states and consider two distributions  = (5 5 3 2)0 and  = (6 4 4 1)0
Then in this context, the pay scale  ∈ C renders () more egalitarian than ()
provided the following four inequalities are satisfied:
5 ≤ 6 (2.7)
25 ≤ 6 + 4 (2.8)
25 + 3 ≤ 6 + 24 (2.9)
25 + 3 + 2 = 6 + 24 + 1 (2.10)
These inequalities are easily expressed in the matrix form (2.5-2.6) where in this
context the matrix  has three rows, six columns, and is easily obtained:
 =
⎛
⎝
0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 −1 2 −1
0 0 1 −2 2 −1
⎞
⎠  (2.11)
while  is the row vector
 = ¡ −1 1 1 −2 2 −1 ¢  (2.12)
°
Consider then summing up the highest  incomes in each distribution, and
taking their diﬀerence. This diﬀerence is clearly a linear function of , and can be
written as
P
=1
[()− ()] = 11 + · · ·+  The row vector (1  )
then defines the  row of the majorization matrix  Likewise by writing
+1P
=1
[()− ()] = 11 + · · ·+  the scalars 1 · · ·   are the elements
of the row vector  We formally define in the appendix of the paper a function
Φ : D×D −→ Z× that maps  and  to the matrix  and we write  = Φ( )
Likewise, we define a function ∆ that maps  and  to the row vector  = ∆( )
We shall refer to the image  of the map Φ as the majorization matrix. As this
matrix plays a central role in our analysis below, we first gather some properties
of this matrix in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 (properties of the majorization matrix) Let the majorization
matrix  = {} with  row  = (1  ) denote the image of ( ) via
the map Φ. Then, there holds the following:
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[1]  = 0 where   an -dimensional vector of ones.
[2]  = 0 if and only if  = 
[3] 1 ≤ dimN() ≤ − 1 for all  6= 
[4] Let  = Φ( ) and  = Φ() Then  = +
[5]  ∈ {−  0  } for all  = 1  .
[6] For all  = 1  − 1 if  = (0  0) then +1 ∈ {−1 0 1} and
at most two elements of +1 are diﬀerent from zero.
[7] (1  ) = (+11  +1) if and only if +1 = +1.
Property [2] states that  is generally a non-zero integer matrix, and is
only identically zero when  equals  [4] is a property of linearity of the map
Φ( ) [5] indicates that any element of the  row of  is no smaller than −
and no larger than  On the other hand, [6] reveals that if the ( − 1) row
of  is equal to zero, then each element of the  row takes one of three values:
−1 0 and 1 [7] indicates that the  and ( + 1) rows of  are identical
when the elements +1 and +1 of the vectors  and  are identical. Finally,
[1] and [3] together indicate that the rank of  cannot exceed − 1, and
that the vector of ones  lies in the null space of 
The set of solutions to a system of linear inequalities in R; { ∈ R :  ≤ }
where  is an × matrix, is defined as a polyhedral set. Note that, by definition,
every polyhedral set is the intersection of a finite number of closed half-spaces,
and accordingly is a closed convex set. The convex hull of a finite set of points is
called a polytope, or convex polytope, in this paper.
Let S be a set in R A point  in S is called an extreme point, if  cannot
be expressed as a convex combination of any two other elements of S That is,
 =  + (1− ) with   ∈  and  ∈ [0 1] entails that  =  =  We shall
make repeated use of a theorem pertaining to convex sets, that we shall refer to as
Minkowski’s theorem. The theorem states that every closed, bounded and convex
set S ⊆ R is equal to the convex hull of its extreme points. The extreme points
of convex polytopes are commonly referred to as vertices 4. Further notation and
definitions, specific to particular sections of the paper, will be introduced where
needed.
4A triangle and its interior for instance is a convex polytope in R2 and its three vertices are
the points of intersection of its three edges.
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3. The majorization set
Our first task in this paper is to characterize the majorization set C ⊆ C such
that () ≺ () for all  ∈ CWe shall approach this task by examining first the
geometry of the set C We shall then study an intermediate set S ⊆ C, defining
the set of scales that render () and () two distributions of the same sum
total. Clearly the majorization set C is a subset of S. It turns out however
that S has all the relevant geometric properties of the majorization set that are
of interest to us. Nonetheless, S is considerably simpler to characterize than
C
3.1. The set of increasing pay scales and related subsets
Consider first the set C This set is a bounded and closed set in R It is also a
convex set. Specifically, C is an −dimensional simplex with + 1 vertices. The
set V(C) of vertices of C has the following elements:
V(C) = max
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
...
0
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ 
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
...
0
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ 
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
...
0
1
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠  
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
...
1
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
 (3.1)
with any  ∈ C being the convex combination of the  + 1 elements of V(C)
When  = 2 C is a triangle with vertices max(0 0)0 max(0 1)0 and max(1 1)0
Set the value of max at unity. Figure 1 provides a sketch of the set of increasing
scales C when  = 3 and max = 1 C has four vertices: 1 = (0 0 0)0 2 =
(0 0 1)0 3 = (0 1 1)0 and 4 = (1 1 1)0 The set C has a pyramidal shape.
The convex hull of a subset of vertices defines a face of the simplex C, and the
vertices (taken individually) are commonly referred to as the zero-dimensional
faces (Ziegler, 1995; ch. 1). The convex hull of any three vertices spans a triangle,
while the convex hull of the four vertices spans the entire set C in three-dimensional
space. Note furthermore that every subset of C (such as the majorization set C)
is by definition also a bounded set in R
Let  and  be two elements of D Clearly, a necessary condition for () to be
more egalitarian than () is that () and () are two distributions of a given
sum total. Accordingly, define the set
S :=
(
 ∈ C :
+1X
=1
() =
+1X
=1
()
)
 (3.2)
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This set is a subset of the null space
N(− ) := { ∈ R :  = 0}  (3.3)
that is, the set of vectors  that equate the sum totals of () and () Geometri-
cally, N(− ) is a hyperplane that is generated by − 1 linearly independent
vectors in R The set S however is the intersection of N(− ) and the set
of increasing pay scales C As such, S is at most generated by  − 1 linearly
independent vectors, and we write the inequality:
dimS ≤ dimN(− ) = − 1 (3.4)
Because the majorization set is a subset of S, we may define C as follows:
C = { ∈ S : () ≺ ();   ∈ D} (3.5)
Also, because we do not fix the scale  defining the distributions  and , there
remains the possibility that some increasing scales order  to be more egalitarian
than , while other scales reverse the majorization ordering. Thus, in what follows
we shall also define the set of scales
C := { ∈ S : () ≺ ();   ∈ D}  (3.6)
We shall call C the dual majorization set.
Finally, there remains the possibility that some scale  ∈ S does not order 
and  This is the set Ck := S\(C ∪ C) and we have that S = C ∪ C ∪
Ck.
3.2. Characterization of the majorization set
The approach we shall follow here will be to characterize the majorization set in
relation to its vertices. This is a well-treaded path in the mathematical sciences.
For instance, the set of doubly stochastic matrices is commonly referred to as
the Birkhoﬀ polytope, and the Birkhoﬀ-von Newman Theorem states that the
vertices of the Birkhoﬀ polytope are the set of permutation matrices (Barvinok,
2002; pp. 56-57). Consider the context of majorization with continuous data,
where  and  are vectors and  is a doubly stochastic matrix. The set of
doubly stochastic matrices  such that  =  is commonly referred to as the
majorization polytope. Brualdi (1984) provides a characterization of this set in
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relation to its vertices. Dahl (1999) similarly extends the results of Brualdi (1984)
in the context of matrix majorization.
We begin by stating a lemma pertaining to the properties of S The proof of
this result is simple and helps to clarify the geometric properties of the majoriza-
tion set.
Lemma 3.1 Consider two distributions   ∈ D Then the set of pay scales
S, such that  and  are two distributions of a given sum total, is a non-empty
convex polytope.
Proof Let  = ∆( ) and construct the following matrix:
1 :=
µ −

¶
(3.7)
Then, some pay scale  satisfies the condition  = 0 if and only if 1 ≤ 0 The
restriction on the vector  to belong to the set of increasing pay scales may be
conveniently expressed as 2 ≤ (0 max)0 where the matrix 2 ∈ Z(+1)× is
defined as follows:
2 :=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−1 0 0 · · · 0
1 −1 0 · · · 0
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 1 −1
0 · · · 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(3.8)
Next, construct the following (+ 3)×  matrix:
 :=
µ 1
2
¶
(3.9)
and define the vector  := (0+2 max)0 Then it is clear that S = { ∈ R :
 ≤ } Thus, S is a polyhedral set. This set is a bounded, closed and convex
subset of R It is defined as the solution to a finite system of linear inequalities.
Accordingly, S is a convex polytope.
Note finally that the set S is generally non-empty. Consider a constant 
such that max ≥  ≥ 0 Then, the constant vector  := (  )0 will always
satisfy the system of inequalities  ≤ , and hence  is always an element of
S ¤
In simple terms, the lemma reveals that the subset S of the set of increasing
pay scales is a solution to a system of +3 linear inequalities in the vector  As
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a result, S is a convex set, taking the form of a polytope 5. Let  denote the
following ( + + 3)×  matrix:
 :=
µ 

¶
(3.10)
The result below summarizes the key geometric properties of the sets S and
C, as well as provides the founding block of all subsequent results obtained in
the paper. In particular, it reveals that the majorization set is also a non-empty
convex polytope:
Theorem 3.2 Consider two distributions   ∈ D and let S and C re-
spectively denote the sets of pay scales that equate the sum totals of the two dis-
tributions and the majorization set  Then:
() The set C is a non-empty convex polytope defined as the solution to a
system of linear inequalities
 ≤
µ
0++2
max
¶
 (3.11)
() the origin 0 and the vector  := max where  is an −dimensional
column vectors of ones, are both vertices of S and C
() every vertex of S and C other than 0 is of the form  = max 
where   is the cumulative distribution of some random variable defined over 
states.
Before we take up each of these three statements in turn, we first mention some
related results from the mathematical sciences. In the context of continuous data,
Dahl (1998) provides a similar characterization of extreme points (and rays) when
the set C takes the form of a convex polyhedral cone. In the context of matrix
majorization with continuous data (i.e. where  and  are matrices), Dahl (1999)
similarly characterizes the vertices of the majorization polytope C consisting of
the row stochastic matrices  such that  = 
Consider now statement () of Theorem 3.2: because C is a non-empty closed
and bounded convex set, Minkowski’s theorem entails that this set may be charac-
terized as the convex hull of its vertices (see Corollary 3.3 below). Next, consider
() and any scalar  ∈ [0 max] Because the constant pay scale  = (  )0
5The result also arises naturally from a geometric perspective as the outcome of constructing
S as the intersection of a hyperplane with a simplex (see Ziegler 1995, ch. 1 for a discussion).
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is always an element of both S and the majorization set, and can be expressed
as an appropriate convex combination of 0 and the vector  it is clear that the
latter two vectors are both vertices of the sets S and C Finally, () reveals
the structure of every vertex of these two sets (other than the origin), as being the
product of max and the cumulative distribution of some random variable defined
over  states. This property is inherited from the ordering 1 ≤ · · · ≤  of the
elements of the vector  In other contexts where the elements of the policy vector
are not naturally ordered, this last result () need no longer hold 6.
Geometrically, vertices are boundary points of a given set; hence vertices may
be also viewed as the boundaries of redistribution policies. That is, we may view
the vertices of C as the limits of pay policies that make the Lorenz curve of
 () more egalitarian than that of  (). Because there are  + + 3 inequalities
defining the majorization set (i.e. the number of rows of the matrix  of (3.10)),
C will possess a finite number of such vertices. Specifically:
Corollary 3.3 The set of vertices {1  } = V(C) provides a minimal
representation of the majorization set C in the sense that:
() C is the convex hull of {1  } and
() each  ∈ C is a convex combination of a family of at most  aﬃnely
independent points from {1  }
The description of V(C) as providing a minimal representation of the set C
is taken from Lay (1982, pp. 116-117); in words it signifies that knowledge of the
set of  points defining V(C) is all that we require to define all the elements
of the majorization set C
We next consider a simple example that illustrates Theorem 3.2 and its corol-
lary 3.3.
Example 2 Let there be  = 3 states,  = (2 2 1) and  = (3 1 1)
Here S is the set of increasing scales such that for each  ∈ S there holds
3P
=1
() =
3P
=1
() We first construct the majorization matrix  as well as the
6We return to this point in Section 4.5 where we examine the majorization set in relation
to a policy vector consisting of a universal benefit and a uniform tax rate, that define a linear
income tax schedule.
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matrices 1 and 2 of Theorem 3.2 to obtain here:
 =
µ
0 1 −1
−1 2 −1
¶
1 =
µ −1 2 −1
1 −2 1
¶
2 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
−1 0 0
1 −1 0
0 1 −1
0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
Stacking vertically  1 and2 allows us to construct the matrix  of Theorem
3.2. On such basis, we easily find that S = { ∈ C : 3 = 22−1}We can also
obtain the vertices of the set C 7. These are 1 = (0 0 0)0 2 = max(0 12 1)0
and 3 = max(1 1 1)0
In Figure 2, we draw once again the set C of Figure 1, and we represent the
three vertices 1 2 and 3 where we fix max at the value 1 In accordance with
Corollary 3.3, these three vertices span the set C here a triangle, in the sense
that C is the convex hull of these three points (the shaded area in Figure 2.)
With the exception of the origin (the vertex 1) the vertices 2 and 3 are of the
form of cumulative distribution functions for a random variable defined over  = 3
states.
Any  ∈ C is expressible in the form of a convex combination
3P
=1
 of the
three vertices. We obtain for instance the following two elements of the majoriza-
tion set C:  = max(050 075 100)0 = 05(2+3) and  = max(000 025 050)0
= 05(1 + 2) It may be verified that () ≺ () and also that () ≺
() °
3.3. Separation result
Theorem 3.2 informs us that the set of pay scales  that render ()more egalitar-
ian than () is a convex set. Applying the same logic, but defining a majorization
matrix  := − any scale  ∈ C that renders  more egalitarian than  satisfies
the set of inequalities  ≤ 0 For this reason it follows also that C is a convex
polytope, and accordingly a convex set.
7A systematic method for deriving the vertices of the majorization set is discussed in the
appendix proof of Theorem 3.2.
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For this reason, it may be useful to conclude this section of the paper with a
result that commonly arises in the analysis of convex sets, namely a separation
result. Let A and B denote two subsets of the set of increasing pay scales C If
there exists a linear functional  : C → R (where  is not identically equal to zero)
and a number  ∈ R such that () ≤  for all  ∈ A and () ≥  for all  ∈ B,
we shall say that the two sets A and B are separated by a hyperplane in C.
To state this separation result, we need to draw an important distinction
between increasing pay scales  that belong to the boundary of C from those that
belong to the interior of this set. Accordingly, we first define the interior of C as
the following subset of R:
C = { ∈ C : 0  1  2  · · ·    max} (3.12)
The boundary of C, denoted C is then the set C\C The result below summarizes
the geometric structure of the two sets C and C in relation to one another, and
as subsets of the set of increasing pay scales:
Proposition 3.4 Let  and  denote two distinct distributions, and let  =
(1  ) denote a row of the majorization matrix  = Φ( ) such that  6= 0
Then the hyperplane
H = { ∈ C :  = 0} (3.13)
separates the majorization sets C and C Furthermore, at most one of the two
majorization sets has points in the interior of C, while the other majorization set
lies on the boundary of the set of increasing pay scales.
That is, the above result informs us that if there are two pay scales  and  such
that () ≺ () and () ≺ () it must be that at least one of the two pay
scales  and  is an element of the boundary of C That is, at most one of the two
majorization sets has points  ∈ C with the property that the pay +1 associated
with pay class + 1 is strictly greater than  while the other majorization set is
contained in the boundary of the set of increasing pay scales. Finally, any non-
zero row of the majorization matrix defines the coordinates of a hyperplane H
that separates the two convex sets C and C
4. Applications of the majorization set
Below we shall consider various applications of the framework we have developed
in Section 3, together with its central results, Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.4.
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4.1. Lorenz-preserving transformations of the pay scale
Because C is a convex set, any function on C that preserves the Lorenz ordering of
 and  must, and can only, be a function  : C → C. Specifically, for some  ∈
C, we can view a new pay scale  ∈ C as a convex combination of  and some
other element  ∈ C such that  (; ) = { ∈ [0 1]   ∈ C :  =  + (1− ) } 
Note that because  and  are themselves convex combinations of the vertices of
C, we have at once:
Corollary 4.1 Let  and  be two distinct distributions, and let  be an
element of C such that  () ≺  (). Then a function  : C → C maps  to
a new scale  such that  () is more egalitarian than  () if and only if  is a
convex combination of  and the vertices of C.
As such for instance, if  = max (1  1)0, then we have that  =  + (1− ) 
is also an element of C. Specifically, for  = 1  − 1, we have that +1 >
+1. This sort of transformation has been discussed by Moyes (1994) in the
income inequality literature:  is said to dominate  in relative diﬀerences, and in
turn here the Lorenz curves of  () and  () will be ordered in the same fashion
as  () and  ().
4.2. Inequality between groups
If a distribution  exhibits a low level of inequality and  has a high level of
inequality under an initial scale ◦, a new scale 1 may bring the Lorenz curves of
 (1) and  (1) closer by making  (1) and  (1) two distributions with a high
level of inequality where  (1) ≺  (1)  Conversely, a new scale 1 may entail
two Lorenz curves  (1) and  (1) close to the equality line with  (1) ≺  (1).
The scope for reducing between groups inequality in the context of discrete data
may be examined formally by studying the null space of the majorization matrix
. The null space of the majorization matrix is the set of pay scales that equate
the  partial sums (2.3) to zero. Some vectors in the null space of the majorization
matrix may belong to the set of increasing pay scales C while others may not. It
is clear that it is the former set, namely N() ∩ C that is of interest to us.
The vertices of C all lie on the boundary of C It is also the case that those
elements of the null space of  that belong to C must lie on the boundary of the
set of increasing scales:
Proposition 4.2Consider two distributions   ∈ D, and let the majorization
matrix  denote the image of ( ) via the map Φ( ) Consider some pay scale
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 ∈ C. Then  ∈ N() if and only if  = 0
In simple terms, a pay scale that equalizes the Lorenz curves of  and  will
typically have at least two identical elements if  and  are distinct distributions.
Put diﬀerently, if  6=  the Lorenz curves pertaining to these two distributions
may be brought to equality using some increasing pay scale. The scope for such
policies is informed by the rank of the matrix : if rank() =  − 1, then
essentially the only scale that equates the Lorenz curves of  and  is of the form
 = (  )0 where 0 ≤  ≤ max. If rank() =  − , then the null space of
 has  linearly independent -dimensional vectors, of which at least one must
belong to C 8. In other terms, the lower the rank of the majorization matrix the
more flexibility there is for the policy maker to reduce between groups inequality:
Corollary 4.3 Consider two distributions   ∈ D, and let the  = Φ( )
denote the majorization matrix. Furthermore, let N() ∩ C denote the subset
of pay scales of the null space of  that also belong to the set of increasing pay
scales C and let  ∈ [0 max] be a scalar. Then,
() If dim(N() ∩ C) = 1 between groups inequality, as measured by the
distance between Lorenz curves, is only zero for uniform pay scales  = (  )0
At  = (  )0 between groups inequality and within groups inequality vanish
simultaneously.
() If dim(N() ∩ C)  1 between groups inequality is zero for pay scales
other than  = (  )0. For such pay scales other than , between groups
inequality may vanish while within groups inequality persists.
Stated diﬀerently, when the null space N() ∩ C is of dimension one, policies
that would equate Lorenz curves do so by confounding both Lorenz curves with
the equality line. On the other hand, when the null space is of higher dimension,
both Lorenz curves may be confounded while remaining distinct from the equality
line.
4.3. Lorenz curve reversals
Having spent some time discussing the scope for equating Lorenz curves, it is
natural to take this discussion one step further, in order to inquire about the
8Returning for instance to Example 2, we may observe that N() ∩ C is the set
{ ∈ C : 3 = 2 = 1}  This set lies clearly on the boundary of C Since rank() = 3 − 1,
the null space is entirely characterized by vectors of the form  = (  )0  See Example 1 for
a majorization matrix with a null space of higher dimension.
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scope for Lorenz curve reversals. It turns out in fact that the result of Theorem
3.2 can be used to shed light on an important problem that was first discussed in
the literature on the measurement of health inequality (Allison and Foster, 2004;
Zheng 2011). It was recognized by these authors that when the scale defining the
economic status of a person is undetermined, two diﬀerent increasing scales  and
 may reverse the Lorenz ordering of two distributions.
The framework developed in this paper is well suited to revisit this problem:
specifically, starting from a scale ◦ ∈ C such that  (◦) ≺  (◦), any new scale
1 ∈ C will preserve the Lorenz ordering of  (◦) and  (◦) if and only if 1 is a
convex combination of the vertices of C. Conversely for a scale  ∈ C to reverse
the ordering of  and  such that there results  () Â  () or  () k  ()  a
necessary condition is that (S \ C) is a non-empty set; in other terms,  must
be selected from a set of scales that do not allow  to be more egalitarian than .
The above reasoning can be taken one step further, to characterize conditions
such that the reversal of Lorenz curves never occurs within the set of scales that
make  and  two distributions of a given sum total. As C is a subset of S, the
condition sought after is that S and C are equal sets: when S = C there
results that S \ C is an empty set. Fortunately, equality of the sets is easily
verified with the help of the vertices of S:
Proposition 4.4 Let  and  be two distributions in D and let  = Φ( )
denote the majorization matrix  Then,  () ≺  () for all scales  ∈ , equiv-
alently C = S if and only if for every vertex  of the set S there holds the
inequality
 ≤ 0  = 1   (4.1)
Stated diﬀerently, when for every vertex  of S, the greatest element of the
vector  is non-positive, the Lorenz curve of  () will lie above that of  () 
for any pay scale that renders () and () two distributions of a given sum
total.
To illustrate the practical relevance of the above result, we continue with our
examination of Example 1 of Section 2.
Example 1 (continued) Return to Example 1 where  = 6 and where
 = (5 5 3 2)0 and  = (6 4 4 1)0 The resulting majorization matrix 
and vector  are given in (2.11) and (2.12). We are interested in characterizing
vectors  ∈ C that allow us to order () and ()
Referring to Proposition 4.4, there are two vertices of S 1 = max(0 0 0 0
1
2
1)0 and 2 = max(0 0 0 12 1 1)0 such that 1 = max(−12 0 0)0 ≤ 03 and 2 =
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max(0 12 0)0 ≥ 03. Proposition 4.4 then alerts us to the possibility that there may
be two scales   ∈ S such that () ≺ () while () ≺ () or () k ()
This is clearly so here, as 1 ∈ C and 2 ∈ C For instance, if we set max = 10
it is easily verified that  = (05 2 3 4 5 65)0 ∈ C while  = (2 2 3 4 5 5)0 ∈ C
It is instructive to characterize the sets C and C of this example. Firstly,
we have
C =
½
 ∈ C :  = 0 and 5 ≤
µ4 + 6
2
¶¾
(4.2)
For the set of scales such that () ≺ () we obtain
C =
½
 ∈ C : 5 = 6 1 = 2 and 4 =
µ3 + 5
2
¶¾
(4.3)
Note that from the separation result of Proposition 3.4, at most one of the two
sets C and C can have points in the interior of C Since  = (05 2 3 4 5 65)0
is an element of the set (4.2), it is the case that C has a non-empty intersection
with C. However, because every scale in (4.3) must satisfy the conditions 5 = 6
and 1 = 2 it is clearly the case that C belongs to the boundary of the set of
increasing scales. °
4.4. Incentives and the majorization set
Informational assumptions regarding (1) what employers can observe about their
employees’ characteristics and eﬀort levels, and (2) what employees can observe
about the results (profits, surplus etc.) of corporations will typically set limits to
what pay scales can be implemented in practice. That incentive considerations
set limits on the extent of redistribution that is feasible is a widely discussed and
documented phenomenon (Roberts, 1984; Hindriks and Myles, 2013, ch. 18). Our
purpose here is to discuss how the majorization set shrinks when it is restricted
to certain incentive compatible pay structures.
When incentive constraints are linear (see below for an example), they may
be generally expressed in the form { ∈ C :  ≤ 0} The subset of incentive
compatible pay scales of the majorization set may then be written in the form
I := { ∈ C :  ≤ 0} (4.4)
Some models of tournament theory for instance entail an increasing pay structure
with pay increments rising with seniority (see Section 6.4 of Cahuc et al. 2014).
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Such incentive compatible pay scales have the property that 2 − 1 ≤ 3 − 2
≤ · · · ≤ −−1; and find considerable support in empirical investigations (Baker
et al. 2014). The resulting property of increasing pay increments can easily be
translated into the system of −2 linear inequalities of the form ≤ 0 discussed
above 9.
The insight provided by tournament theory is to enable us to relate the de-
terminants of the pay increments to the contractual environment of the firm and
to workers’ risk preferences. Specifically, the pay increments may be shown to
rise with the standard deviation of the unobserved component of workers’ eﬀort
distribution in a given pay class, and also with the number of workers  who
occupy this class . Furthermore, when workers are risk averse (rather than risk
neutral), such theories predict that pay increments should fall, rather than rise,
with seniority.
4.5. Optimal taxation
An examination of the optimal tax literature is a useful setting for thinking about
extensions to the framework developed here. Specifically, the context discussed
below allows one to consider alternative applications of the majorization set, where
for instance the set refers to policy parameters rather than ordered pay scales.
Consider then a simple case where there are  = 2 ordered states pertaining to
productivity levels 1 and 2 and where 0  1  2  max. Each individual has
a time endowment of one unit so that 1 and 2 also denote the full incomes of the
1 and 2 workers of each type, and ¯ = (11 +22)(1 +2) is the aver-
age productivity level. A linear income tax maps the distribution of productivities
(full incomes) to a distribution of consumption (i.e. net earnings), with two con-
sumption levels  =  + (1−) for  = 1 2. The parameter  ∈ [0 1] captures
the distortionary eﬀect of taxation and 1− is the (constant) marginal propensity
to spend on leisure (see for instance Mirrlees, 1971 and Atkinson, 1973). Here  is
a lump sum universal benefit and  is the uniform income tax rate. It is clear that
1 and 2 are fixed here, and that only the  vector is to be chosen (via choice
of values for the universal benefit and tax rate). The particular choice of policy
instruments  and  will depend among other factors on () the level of inequality
9For instance, if there are say  = 4 seniority levels, the system of inequalities takes the formµ −1 2 −1 0
0 −1 2 −1
¶ ⎛⎜⎜⎝
1
2
3
4
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ≤
µ
0
0
¶
.
20
in the distribution of productivities (the diﬀerence between 2 and 1) () the
population shares of low and high productivity workers (1 and 2) and () the
distortionary eﬀect of taxation (how large 1−  is) 10.
Perhaps the most interesting insight this exercise can oﬀer is the need to recog-
nize that in some instances it may be more illuminating to express the inequalities
directly in terms of the policy parameters that define the relevant set of pay scales
such that the distribution of post-tax earnings (consumption) is more egalitarian
than the distribution of productivities (full incomes) In doing so, however, we
turn our attention to expressing the 1 + 2 partial sums  ≤ 0 in a more
detailed form, replacing  by functions of  1, 2 1 and 2 (the data of the
redistribution problem) as well as  and  (the policy instruments). We come also
to accept that the sum total of the distribution of post-tax earnings is lower than
that of full incomes when   1 This leads us to choose  and  instead to equate
the mean post-tax earnings level and  that is a share of the mean, rather than
the mean, of the distribution of productivities. In turn, this entails writing the
partial sums as a product of the majorization matrix and two other matrices:
⎛
⎝
0 2 0 −2
1 2 −1 −2
−1 −2 1 2
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 1 0
1 2 0
0 0 1
0 0 2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎝

1− 
1
⎞
⎠ ≤
µ
0
0
¶
 (4.5)
Note here the simple form of the majorization matrix that arises when comparing
a fixed distribution  under two diﬀerent income vectors  (full income) and 
(post-tax earnings). The above formulation has the advantage of making the ma-
jorization matrix appear clearly as an integer matrix that satisfies the properties
of Lemma 2.1. But it is also the case that this formulation now requires the in-
troduction of an additional matrix (the middle matrix) parametrized by a subset
of the data of the redistribution problem (the distortionary eﬀect of taxation and
the vector of productivities).
The constraints on the policy parameters are that (1)  equals  and (2)
that  lies between 0 and 1 Note that the first of these conditions is implied by
the second and third rows of (4.5). Upon substituting  for  the inequality
 ≥ 0 is implied by the first inequality of (4.5). Finally, the inequality  ≤ 1
10There are additional important considerations needed in order to select the Pareto eﬃcient
level of  and   These include redistributive objectives, viz the parameterization of the social
welfare function embodying society’s preferences, and the share of total income that is committed
to subsistence expenditure. See Deaton (1983) and Salanié (2003).
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is a liability constraint: it precludes tax authorities from levying more tax than
workers’ earnings. The resulting majorization set in this context becomes the
set of ordered pairs ( ) that lie within the line segment with vertices (0 0)
and (¯ 1) The majorization set expands when the average productivity level
increases, and when the distortionary eﬀect of taxation diminishes. Note finally
that because ( ) is not an ordered vector in the way pay scales are, the first
statement of Theorem 3.2 holds, but () and () of the same theorem no longer
apply in the context of the linear income tax.
5. Conclusions
This paper has examined the problem of comparing distributions of a variable
defined over a finite number of pay states, from the perspective of the Lorenz
ordering. The particular problem we have chosen to address was that of charac-
terizing the set of pay scales that allow for a Lorenz ranking of two distributions.
This particular perspective has enabled us to address related questions of inter-
est, such as the scope for reducing between groups inequality, as measured by the
distance between Lorenz curves, and the extent to which Lorenz curve reversals
may occur under two diﬀerent pay scales.
We have shown that the problem of characterizing the set of pay scales that
allow for a comparison of Lorenz curves in presence of a finite number of economic
states has for solution a particular type of convex set known as a polytope. That is,
the majorization set is a convex set, defined as the convex hull of a finite number of
points, known as the vertices of the set. The significance of the above result is the
following: even though the set of pay scales that allow for an ordering of Lorenz
curves has an infinite number of points, this set has a minimal representation in
terms of a finite number of vertices, and every pay scale in the majorization set
arises as a convex combination of a subset of these vertices. The vertices are then
jointly suﬃcient statistics for generating the majorization set.
Central to this result and its applications, is a majorization matrix that we
have introduced in the paper, that allows us to express the partial sums (inequal-
ities) defining Lorenz dominance. Our second result was to apply a well-known
result in convex analysis, the separation theorem, to show that in general the
majorization set and its dual, the majorization set that reverses the ordering of
Lorenz curves, may be separated using a given number of hyperplanes, the coor-
dinates of which are the non-zero rows of the majorization matrix.
Our final application in Section 4 gave a brief overview of the majorization set
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in the context of the design of a linear income tax scheme consisting of a lump
sum transfer and a unique marginal tax rate. There are clearly many other areas
of application of the majorization set that may form the basis of future research,
such as for instance its analysis in the context of diﬀerential commodity taxation
and social insurance schemes more broadly.
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6. Appendix
This appendix gathers the proofs of the results stated in Sections 3 and 4, together
with the proof of Lemma 2.1. We begin with a formal definition of the function
Φ that maps D ×D to majorization matrices.
For 1 ≤  ≤  define the zero-one matrix Γ = [ 0] where  is the
−dimensional identity matrix and where 0 is a  × ( + 1 − ) matrix of ze-
roes. Then Γ is a × (+1) selection matrix such that Γ = (1  )0 for all
 ∈ D In words, Γ is the vector comprising the  richest individuals from the
distribution  Observe also that Γ1 = 1 and Γ = (1  )0
We next define the (row) vector function  : D ×D −→ Z1× as follows:
( ) := count(Γ)− count(Γ)  = 1   (6.1)
We then construct the  ×  matrix Φ( ) with  row given by the function
( ) Thus, we define for all   ∈ D the matrix function
Φ( ) :=
⎛
⎜⎝
1( )
...
( )
⎞
⎟⎠ (6.2)
such that Φ( ) maps D ×D into the set of  ×  integer matrices Z×
We also define for   ∈ D
∆( ) := count()− count() (6.3)
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where ∆ maps D ×D into Z1×
For the proof of Lemma 2.1, we shall require to define E as the set of  × 
zero-one matrices such that each row  = (1  ) of a matrix  ∈ E has
exactly one unique element equal to 1 and all other elements equal to 0 :
E = { ∈ Z× :  ∈ {0 1}
X
=1
 = 1 for all  = 1  } (6.4)
Recall that Γ = [ 0] is a ×(+1) selection matrix, such that for any  ∈ D and
any  ∈ C Γ() = (1()   ())0. It follows that Γ() may be expressed
as Γ() =  where  ∈ E is a zero-one matrix.
Let  ∈ Z× denote a lower triangular matrix with element  = 1 for all  ≥ 
and  = 0 for all    Then, for any  ∈ R  is the vector which cumulates
the elements of  and has for  component 1 + +  Accordingly,
 =
⎛
⎜⎝
 (Γ1())
...
 (Γ())
⎞
⎟⎠ (6.5)
Likewise define  ∈ E such that (1()   ())0 =  Defining the  × 
integer matrix
 :=  − (6.6)
it may readily be observed that  = Φ( ) may equivalently be constructed as
 =  (6.7)
i.e. the product of two integer matrices.
Observe also that since  is a full rank square matrix, N( ) = 0 Accord-
ingly, − and  =  (−) are matrices of identical rank. It follows then
that for any  ∈ C we have  ∈ N() if and only if  ∈ N( −)
Note furthermore that for the first row of  and  we have the equality (11
  1) = (11   1) while,
(21  2) = (11 + 21  1 + 2)
= (11 + + 1) + (21 + + 2) (6.8)
By repeated application of the above identities, we obtain for all  = 2   :
(1  ) = (−11 + + −1) + (1 + + ) (6.9)
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We are now ready to proceed to the proof of Lemma 5.1.
Proof of Lemma 2.1 (1) Consider the  row of  If  =  then
the  row of  is equal to zero. If on the other hand  =  and  =  with
 6=  then  = 1  = −1 and  = 0 for all  6=   In both cases, we
find that
P
=1
 = 0; accordingly,  =  = 0
(2) Since  =  where  is a full rank matrix,  = 0 entails  = 0
In turn this entails that  =  Conversely, if  =  then  = 0 and  is a
matrix of zeroes.
(3) From (1) we have that  ∈ N() so that dimN() ≥ 1
Now assume that 1 = −1 1 =  and for all  = 2   we have  =  Then
1−1 = 1 1 = −1 and all other elements of  are equal to zero. Since the
resulting matrix has rank 1 and  columns, its null space is of dimension − 1
Therefore it is the case that if  6=  then dimN() ≤ − 1
(4) Let  = Φ( ) and  = Φ() Then,  =  ( −) =  [( −
) + ( −)]. That is,  = +
(5) Consider two vectors  and , such that 1 = · · · =  =  and
1 = · · · =  =  Let  be an element of the set of indices {1  } If  =  and
 6=  then  =  If  =  and  6=  then  = − Note also that if  = 
then  = 0 Any  is thus bounded by the values − and 
(6) Since   are elements of E  it follows from (6.9) that if (1  )
= (0  0) then (+11  +1) can only have at most two non-zero elements,
and that +1 ∈ {−1 0 1}
(7) The  row of  is equal to zero if and only if  =  Thus, from
(6.9) it follows that (−11  −1) = (1  ) if and only if  = . ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.2 () Let  = Φ( ) denote the image of ( ) via the
map (6.2). Then, a vector  ∈ R satisfies the  first partial sums (2.3) defining
the majorization relation () ≺ (), if and only if  ≤ 0 The  + 1 partial
sums [2.3-2.4] can now be conveniently be expressed as follows:µ 
1
¶
 ≤ 0+2
where 1 is the matrix (3.7) of Lemma 3.1. The restriction on the vector  to
belong to the set of increasing scales is also expressed as2 ≤ (0 max)0 where
the matrix 2 is defined in (3.8). Thus defining  := (0++2 max)0, we have
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that C = { ∈ R :  ≤ } where  is the matrix of (3.10). Thus, C is a
polyhedral set. This set is bounded, closed and convex. Also, because  has a
finite number of rows, C is a convex polytope.
Note furthermore that the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.1 can be
used to show that C is generally a non-empty set in R and that its dimension
is at least equal to 1.
() Turning to the vertices of C consider first the vector  = max Since 
satisfies the system of inequalities (3.11) of Theorem 3.2, it follows that  ∈ C
On the other hand,  cannot be obtained as a convex combination of any elements
from the set C\{} It follows that  must be a vertex of C
Next consider vertices other than  = max Let J := {1  } denote a
set of  indices from the set {1 2  ++3} and let  := J( ) and  := J()
denote respectively the -dimensional square matrix and vector constructed using
rows 1   of the matrix  and the vector . From Theorem 2.4.2 of Barvinok
(2002), every vertex of C is the solution  to some system of linearly independent
equations  =  where  ∈ C Consider first the case where  is a vector of
zeroes (that is, max ∈ ; equivalently, the index  +  + 3 pertaining to the last
row of the matrix  is not an element of the set of indices J used to construct
the matrix  and the vector ) Then, since  is a vertex of C it follows that
 is a full rank matrix. Thus, the only solution to  = 0 is the trivial solution
 = 0 and the origin is a vertex of C. Thus () holds.
() Consider next the case where  +  + 3 ∈ J, so that max ∈  Then,
the solution to the system of linearly independent equations  =  is  = −1
a vector of  linear combinations of the elements 0 and max where one such
elements of  is equal to max Since  ∈ C it follows that 0 ≤ 1 ≤  ≤  =
max. Thus,  = max , where  is the cumulative distribution of some random
variable defined over  states.
Now consider the set S From Lemma 3.1, S as C is a convex polytope
contained within C The proof of (− ) in relation to S proceeds exactly as
the above arguments in the context of C ¤
The next lemma states that if there is a pay vector  such that () is more
egalitarian than () and this  is in the interior of C then any  such that ()
is more egalitarian than () must lie on the boundary of C (and vice versa)
Lemma A1 Let   ∈ D with  6= . Assume there is a  ∈ C\C Then
the set C\C is empty. Likewise if there is a  ∈ C\C, then the set C\C
is empty.
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Proof of Lemma A1 Let  be an element of the set C\C and assume, to
the contrary, that there is a + ∈ C\C Since by assumption  6=  it follows
from [2] that  = Φ( ) must be a non-zero matrix. Consider then the first
non-zero row  = (1  ) of this matrix. Then, from [6], there are at
most two indices   ∈ {1  } such that     6= 0  = − and, by
assumption, +  ≤ 0 Since () ≺ () it also follows from [6] that
 = 1 and  = −1 From the assumption that  ∈ C it also follows that
0    
Now since + ∈ C\C it is also the case that + + + ≥ 0 But since+ ∈ C this inequality entails that + = +  In turn, + = + entails that+ ∈ C in contradiction with the assumption that + ∈ C\C ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.4 Define the integer matrix  := − Then it
follows that the dual majorization set may be defined as C = { ∈ S :  ≤
0} Accordingly, Theorem 3.2 entails that C is a convex polytope. Furthermore,
this set is non-empty as the constant pay scale (  ) for  ∈ [0 max] belongs
to this set.
Next consider a hyperplane H = { ∈ C :  = 0} where  6= (0  0) is a
non-zero row of the majorization matrix  Since any element  ∈ C satisfies
the inequalities  ≤ 0 while any  ∈ C satisfies the inequalities  ≥ 0 the
hyperplane H separates the two majorization sets.
Assume that C has a point  ∈ C Then, from Lemma 1 C\C is an
empty set. It follows that C has an empty intersection with the interior of C.
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Proof of Proposition 4.2 (⇒) Let  = 0 where  ∈ C We proceed by
induction on the rows 1   of  to establish that  = 0
Consider first 1 = (11  1) There are (at most) two indices   ∈
{1  } such that 1 + 1 = 0 1 + 1 = 0,  6=  and 1 = 0
for all  6=   If 1 6= 0 then 1 = −1 and 1 + 1 = 0 entails
 =  But this case is ruled out since by assumption  is an interior point of C
Hence we conclude that 1 = 1 = 0 and thus that 1 = (11  1) = (0  0)
Now assume that for row −1 of  we have −1 = (0  0) Then, from [6]
of Lemma 2.1, in row  of  there are again at most two indices   ∈ {1  }
such that + = 0 + = 0,  6=  and  = 0 for all 6=  We
now invoke the same argument as in the case of 1 to establish that  = (0  0)
(⇐) Let  = 0 Then C ⊆ N() and hence C ⊆ N() ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.4 It is clear that C ⊆ S Hence we need to
prove that S ⊆ C if and only if for every vertex of the set S there holds the
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inequality (4.1).
Let V(S) = {1  } Then, since from Lemma 3.1 S is a convex
polytope, Minkowski’s theorem entails that every  ∈ S can be expressed in the
form
⎛
⎜⎝
1
...

⎞
⎟⎠ = 1
⎛
⎜⎝
11
...
1
⎞
⎟⎠+ · · ·+ 
⎛
⎜⎝
1
...

⎞
⎟⎠  (6.10)
0 ≤ 1   ≤ 1 and
X
=1
 = 1 (6.11)
Assume first that S ⊆ C Then this entails from the definition of C that
every  ∈ S satisfies the inequalities  ≤ 0 That is, (11+ · · ·+) ≤ 0
where 1   satisfy the conditions of (6.11). In particular, for  = 1 and = 0 for all  6=  we must have  ≤ 0
Conversely, assume that for each  = 1   there holds  ≤ 0 Then, since
each  in (6.10) is non-negative, it follows that (11+ · · ·+ ) ≤ 0 Thus,
from (6.10) we have that  ≤ 0 for each  ∈ S. Accordingly, we conclude
that S ⊆ C ¤
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Figure 1 
The set C and its four vertices when n = 3 and 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1 
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Figure 2 
The majorization set 𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 of Example 2 and its three vertices when n = 3 and 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1 
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